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An Economic Model of Strategic Electoral Rule Choice Under Uncertainty

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  • Matakos, Konstantinos
  • Xefteris, Dimitrios

Abstract

We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and uncertainty over the electoral outcome is present. We show that when all dominant parties (parties with positive probability of winning the elections) have su¢ ciently good chances of winning, then they agree to change the PR with a more majoritarian rule. We identify the exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the expected vote share of the minority parties (parties with zero probability of winning). The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for such collusion in favour of a majoritarian rule are: a) the high rents from a single-party government, b) su¢ cient uncertainty over the electoral outcome and c) ideological proximity of the dominant parties.

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  • Matakos, Konstantinos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2011. "An Economic Model of Strategic Electoral Rule Choice Under Uncertainty," Economic Research Papers 271283, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:271283
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271283
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