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The Economics of Corruption in Less Developed Countries: A Review of Issues

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  • Pranab Bardhan.

Abstract

In this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption. We then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in the economy, while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases. We pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also so persistent. Finally, we examine the feasible policy issues that arise.

Suggested Citation

  • Pranab Bardhan., 1996. "The Economics of Corruption in Less Developed Countries: A Review of Issues," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C96-064, University of California at Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c96-064
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    2. Cadot, Olivier, 1987. "Corruption as a gamble," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 223-244, July.
    3. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
    4. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
    5. Unknown, 1986. "Letters," Choices: The Magazine of Food, Farm, and Resource Issues, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 1(4), pages 1-9.
    6. Wade, Robert, 1985. "The market for public office: Why the Indian state is not better at development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 467-497, April.
    7. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Manzoor Ahmed, 2023. "Political Economy of Discretionary Allocation of Annual Development Programmes: Theory and Evidence from Balochistan (Article)," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 62(2), pages 167-197.
    2. Manzoor Ahmed, 2023. "Political Economy of Elite Capture and Clientelism in Public Resource Distribution: Theory and Evidence from Balochistan, Pakistan," India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, , vol. 79(2), pages 223-243, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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