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The Two-dimensional Model of Jury Decision Making

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  • Holler, Manfred J.

Abstract

This paper discusses a two-dimensional jury model. It combines the idea of winning a maximum of votes in a voting game with utility maximization that derives from the winning proposition. The model assumes a first mover, the plaintiff, and a second-mover, the counsel of the defendant. Typically, these agents represent parties that have conflicting interests. Here they face a jury that consists of three groups of voters such that no single group has a majority of votes. Each group is characterized by homogeneous preferences on three alternatives that describe the possible outcomes. The outcome is selected by a simple majority of the jury members. The agents are interested in both gaining the support of a majority of jury members and seeing their preferred alternative selected as outcome. It will be demonstrated that equilibrium decision making can be derived for this model.

Suggested Citation

  • Holler, Manfred J., 2012. "The Two-dimensional Model of Jury Decision Making," IEL Working Papers 10, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    • Handle: RePEc:uca:ucaiel:10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Serguei Kaniovski & Alexander Zaigraev, 2011. "Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 439-459, October.
    2. Wittman, Donald A., 1973. "Parties as Utility Maximizers," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 490-498, June.
    3. Manfred Holler, 1980. "What is paradoxical about the voting paradox?," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 679-685, October.
    4. José Casas Pardo & Pedro Schwartz (ed.), 2007. "Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12578.
    5. Manfred Holler, 1982. "The relevance of the voting paradox: a restatement," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 43-53, February.
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