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Local Power to Tax and Devolution: An Empirical Assessment of the French Constitutional Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Alain Guenguant

    (CREM - CNRS)

  • Jean-Michel Josselin

    (CREM - CNRS)

Abstract

The article explores the content and consequences of the French constitutional reform of March 2003. Among the objectives of that reform, one is to preserve the tax autonomy for the local public sector; another is to ensure that the coming wave of devolution of competencies to decentralised levels of government will be adequately financed. These constitutional safeguards are assessed and they prove to be somewhat counterproductive, as if the recourse to the higher level of juridical norms could not replace the legislative level when reforms of local public finance, however difficult, have to be conducted.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Guenguant & Jean-Michel Josselin, 2006. "Local Power to Tax and Devolution: An Empirical Assessment of the French Constitutional Reform," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 200612, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:200612
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2004. "Federalism and subsidiarity in national and international contexts," Post-Print halshs-00076694, HAL.
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    6. Howitt, Peter & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1995. "The political economy of inaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 329-353, March.
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    8. Galeotti,Gianluigi & Salmon,Pierre & Wintrobe,Ronald (ed.), 2000. "Competition and Structure," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521771337, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central government; Constitutional reform; France; Local public sector; Local taxation; National grants.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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