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The Dual Political Legislation Cycle in France

Author

Listed:
  • Fabio Padovano

    (CREM CNRS UMR6211 and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France - DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy)

  • Nicolas Gavoille

    (CREM CNRS UMR6211 and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France)

Abstract

This paper tests the Political Legislation Cycle theory on French data. The theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when the legislator increases voters’ utility in order to be reelected. France is unique in that two elections set up the pace of political life: the presidential and the legislative elections which potentially generate a dual legislation cycle. A hierarchical Poisson model is implemented on a sample containing the monthly legislative production from January 1959 to March 2012. We found that 1) a dual cycle of the production of laws emerges, following both the presidential and the legislative elections, 2) since the constitutional reform of 2000, which synchronized the two elections, the magnitude of the cycle increased, and 3) the President of the Republic does not have an impact on the legislative production, but relies on the government.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Padovano & Nicolas Gavoille, 2013. "The Dual Political Legislation Cycle in France," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2013-02-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy, revised Jun 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2013-02-ccr
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    File URL: https://ged.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/esupversions/1ee477a9-720f-449e-97e0-75a1ea0377de
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Alfò & Giovanni Trovato, 2004. "Semiparametric mixture models for multivariate count data, with application," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 7(2), pages 426-454, December.
    2. Marco Alfò & Giovanni Trovato, 2004. "Semiparametric Mixture Models for Multivariate Count Data, with Application," CEIS Research Paper 51, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
    3. Josef Brechler & Adam Geršl, 2014. "Political legislation cycle in the Czech Republic," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 137-153, June.
    4. Toke Aidt & Francisco Veiga & Linda Veiga, 2011. "Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 21-44, July.
    5. Tsebelis, George, 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 591-608, September.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Josef Brechler & Adam Geršl, 2014. "Political legislation cycle in the Czech Republic," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 137-153, June.
    2. Gael Lagadec, 2014. "Are political support-driven policies always bad? The case of large interest groups," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 3(2), pages 138-147, December.
    3. Francesco Lagona & Antonello Maruotti & Fabio Padovano, 2015. "Multilevel multivariate modelling of legislative count data, with a hidden Markov chain," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 178(3), pages 705-723, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Legislation Cycle; Economic theory of legislation; Political Budget Cycle; Hierarchical Poisson regression;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C49 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Other
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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