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Determinants of Electoral Outcomes: A simple Test of Meltzer and Richard's Hypothesis

Author

Listed:
  • Benoît Le Maux

    (University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS)

  • Federica Minardy

    (Piemonte Orientale University)

  • Charlotte Magalhaes

    (University of Rennes 1)

Abstract

The present study aims to test Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that lower-income individuals vote for candidates who favor higher taxes and more redistribution. Assuming that left-wing parties advocate a general increase in taxation, we estimate a vote function for the French Cantonal elections. We show clear-cut evidence that an increasing proportion of voters receiving social assistance raises the number of votes in favor of left-wing parties. This result highlights the importance of including redistribution aspects when estimating a vote function.

Suggested Citation

  • Benoît Le Maux & Federica Minardy & Charlotte Magalhaes, 2011. "Determinants of Electoral Outcomes: A simple Test of Meltzer and Richard's Hypothesis," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2011-03-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2011-03-ccr
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cribari-Neto, Francisco, 2004. "Asymptotic inference under heteroskedasticity of unknown form," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 215-233, March.
    2. Kevin Sylwester, 2003. "Income Inequality And Population Density 1500 Ad: A Connection," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 61-82, December.
    3. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vote Function; Local Government; Redistribution; Party ideology;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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