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Heterogenous switching costs

Author

Listed:
  • Biglaiser, Gary
  • Crémer, Jacques
  • Dobos, Gergely

Abstract

We consider a simple two period model where consumers have different switching costs. Before the market opens, there was an incumbent who sold to all consumers. We identify the equilibrium both with Stackelberg and Bertrand competition and show how the presence of low switching cost consumers benefits the incumbent, despite the fact that it never sells to any of them.

Suggested Citation

  • Biglaiser, Gary & Crémer, Jacques & Dobos, Gergely, 2013. "Heterogenous switching costs," TSE Working Papers 13-451, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27787
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse, Hans & Provoost, Thomas, 2010. "Enhancing market power by reducing switching costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 131-133, November.
    2. Paulo Somaini & Liran Einav, 2013. "A Model of Market Power in Customer Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 938-986, December.
    3. Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), 2012. "Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14933.
    4. Biglaiser, Gary & Crémer, Jacques & Dobos, Gergely, 2013. "The value of switching costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 935-952.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 1987. "Markets with Consumer Switching Costs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 375-394.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    switching; cost;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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