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Efficiency vs. equity concerns in regulatory sandboxes

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Listed:
  • Crampes, Claude
  • Estache, Antonio

Abstract

The paper makes the case for a more systematic ex-ante assessment of the distribution of gains and losses from efficiency enhancing innovations that regulatory sandboxes are expected to test. It shows how a prior formal modelling of tests can inform the regulators on the possible need to control better upfront in the design of the sandbox for some otherwise underestimated but predictable distributional effects. Failing to do so is likely to lead to underestimate efficiency-equity trade-offs and other distributional issues, across stakeholders or within groups of stakeholders. Simple Industrial Organization models will often suffice to identify the potential issues at an early stage and allow better sandboxes designs and hence more reliable policy relevant results.

Suggested Citation

  • Crampes, Claude & Estache, Antonio, 2023. "Efficiency vs. equity concerns in regulatory sandboxes," TSE Working Papers 23-1466, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:128459
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmanuelle Auriol & Claude Crampes & Antonio Estache, 2021. "Regulating public services, bridging the gap between theory and practice," Post-Print hal-03473074, HAL.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    3. Estache, Antonio & Foucart, Renaud, 2021. "On the political economy of industrial, labor and social reforms as complements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    4. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulatory sandboxes; innovation; governance; anti-trust; regulation; efficiency; equity; quality standards;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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