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Price Parallelism in the Greek Steel Market: Evidence of a False Cartel Accusation

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  • Ivaldi, Marc
  • Katsoulacos, Yannis

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  • Ivaldi, Marc & Katsoulacos, Yannis, 2023. "Price Parallelism in the Greek Steel Market: Evidence of a False Cartel Accusation," TSE Working Papers 23-1454, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:128181
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Besanko & Ulrich Doraszelski, 2004. "Capacity Dynamics and Endogenous Asymmetries in Firm Size," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 23-49, Spring.
    2. John Haltiwanger & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1991. "The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 89-106, Spring.
    3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    4. Gasmi, F & Laffont, J J & Vuong, Q, 1992. "Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behavior in a Soft-Drink Market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 277-311, Summer.
    5. Harrington, Joseph E., 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-105, August.
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