The impact of competition on expert's information disclosure: the case of real estate brokers
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More about this item
Keywords
Information revelation; Competition; Price appraisal; Real Estate Bro-; kers;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General
- L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2021-11-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-REG-2021-11-01 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2021-11-01 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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