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How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework

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  • Aloysius Siow

Abstract

The paper surveys the Choo Siow (CS) marriage matching model and its extensions. CS derives a behavioral marriage matching function. The collective model of intra-household allocations can be integrated into this framework. Spousal labor supplies respond to changing marriage market conditions. Marriage market tightness, the ratio of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a sufficient statistic for marriage market conditions for those types of individuals. The hypothesis that spousal labor supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions. The framework extends to a dynamic marriage matching environment. Empirically, this paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in Sichuan affected the marital behavior of famine born cohorts. Marriage market tightness is shown to be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the United States. Marriage market conditions in the contemporary United States primarily affect spousal labor force participation rather than hours of work.

Suggested Citation

  • Aloysius Siow, 2008. "How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework," Working Papers tecipa-322, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-322
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    Cited by:

    1. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Jaerim Choi, 2021. "Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 473-509, September.
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9ur9159sab6hvkck is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Decker, Colin & Lieb, Elliott H. & McCann, Robert J. & Stephens, Benjamin K., 2013. "Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 778-792.
    5. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Working Papers tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    6. Alpern, Steve & Katrantzi, Ioanna & Ramsey, David, 2014. "Equilibrium population dynamics when mating is by mutual choice based on age," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 63-72.
    7. Katja Maria Kaufmann & Matthias Messner & Alex Solis, 2013. "Returns to Elite Higher Education in the Marriage Market: Evidence from Chile," Working Papers 489, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    8. Bautista Lacambra, Sergio, 2020. "Household labor supply: Collective results for certain developed countries," MPRA Paper 101514, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
    10. Liang Chen & Eugene Choo & Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2021. "Matching Function Equilibria with Partial Assignment: Existence, Uniqueness and Estimation," Working Papers hal-03936296, HAL.
    11. Kenneth Burdett & Mei Dong & Ling Sun & Randall Wright, 2016. "Marriage, Markets, And Money: A Coasian Theory Of Household Formation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(2), pages 337-368, May.
    12. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9ur9159sab6hvkck is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Dapeng Zhang & Xiaokun (Cara) Wang, 2020. "Investigation of Freight Agents’ Interaction Considering Partner Selection and Joint Decision Making," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(9), pages 1-15, May.
    14. Seul-Ki Shin, 2014. "Preferences vs. Opportunities: Racial/Ethnic Intermarriage in the United States," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-040, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    15. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Working Papers hal-03460155, HAL.
    16. Zhang, Dapeng & (Cara) Wang, Xiaokun, 2018. "Understanding many-to-many matching relationship and its correlation with joint response," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 249-260.
    17. J. Emery & Ana Ferrer, 2009. "Marriage market imbalances and labor force participation of Canadian women," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 43-57, March.
    18. Liang Chen & Eugene Choo & Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2021. "Matching Function Equilibria with Partial Assignment: Existence, Uniqueness and Estimation," Papers 2102.02071, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    19. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Working Papers hal-03460155, HAL.
    20. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Working Papers tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    21. Liang Chen & Eugene Choo & Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2021. "Matching Function Equilibria with Partial Assignment: Existence, Uniqueness and Estimation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03936296, HAL.
    22. Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2024. "Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Papers 2403.05222, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage; matching; collective model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J - Labor and Demographic Economics

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