Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model : A graphical and closed-form solution
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- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model : A graphical and closed-form solution," Discussion Paper 1995-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998.
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- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1996. "The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Other publications TiSEM c8b984f9-6270-4052-b06b-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1996. "The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Discussion Paper 1996-44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1998. "The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness," Other publications TiSEM edcd13f6-471a-415a-b14e-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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