Uncertain central bankers preferences: some implications of multiplicative versus additive uncertainty
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DOI: 10.1080/135048501750041222
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- D. A. Peel, 2000. "Uncertain central bankers' preferences: some implications of multiplicative versus additive uncertainty," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(12), pages 771-773.
References listed on IDEAS
- Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1998.
"Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty : Walsh-Svensson Non-Equivalence Revisited,"
Other publications TiSEM
136335cb-d3f9-4b0b-b9ec-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1998. "Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty : Walsh-Svensson Non-Equivalence Revisited," Discussion Paper 1998-11, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Charles Nolan & Eric Schaling, 1996. "Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability," Bank of England working papers 54, Bank of England.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1995.
"Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model : A graphical and closed-form solution,"
Discussion Paper
1995-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model : A graphical and closed-form solution," Other publications TiSEM c0088be4-00da-4fea-8ab5-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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Cited by:
- Chesang, Laban K. & Naraidoo, Ruthira, 2016.
"Parameter uncertainty and inflation dynamics in a model with asymmetric central bank preferences,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-10.
- Laban K. Chesang & Ruthira Naraidoo, 2014. "Parameter Uncertainty and Inflation Dynamics in a Model with Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences," Working Papers 201437, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
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