Macroeconomic policy games with incomplete information : Some extensions
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- Driffill, John, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information: Some Extensions," CEPR Discussion Papers 159, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Driffill, John, 1988.
"Macroeconomic policy games with incomplete information : A survey,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 533-541, March.
- Driffill, John, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy Games With Incomplete Information - A Survey," Economic Research Papers 268247, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Driffill, John, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information - A Survey," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 288, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Juan Ayuso Huertas, 1991. "Los efectos del anuncio de un objetivo de inflación," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 15(3), pages 627-644, September.
- Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
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