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Time inconsistency in environmental policy : Tax earmarking as a commitment solution

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  • Marsiliani, L.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Renstrom, T.I.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Marsiliani, L. & Renstrom, T.I., 1999. "Time inconsistency in environmental policy : Tax earmarking as a commitment solution," Other publications TiSEM a19296e0-8a06-4dd0-9163-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a19296e0-8a06-4dd0-9163-d85e72f18538
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(5), pages 457-457.
    2. Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1999. "Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 151-164, March.
    3. Biglaiser, Gary & Horowitz, John K & Quiggin, John, 1995. "Dynamic Pollution Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 33-44, July.
    4. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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