Monopoly unions, investment and employment : Benefits of contingent wage contracts
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References listed on IDEAS
- Buiter, Willem H, 1981.
"The Superiority of Contingent Rules over Fixed Rules in Models with Rational Expectations,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(363), pages 647-670, September.
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Cited by:
- Moors, J.J.A., 1987. "A quantile alternative for kurtosis," Other publications TiSEM 24ab7106-1b62-42f8-a958-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Batenburg, P.C. & Kriens, J., 1987. "Bayesian discovery sampling : A simple model of Bayesian inference in auditing," Other publications TiSEM a0e1780a-0848-4728-aad9-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Casimir, R.J., 1986. "DSS, information systems and management games," Other publications TiSEM 1ea4f0cb-0ee6-41bb-8b37-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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