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Strictness of Leniency Programs and Cartels of Asymmetric Firms

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  • Motchenkova, E.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Laan, R.

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  • Motchenkova, E. & Laan, R., 2005. "Strictness of Leniency Programs and Cartels of Asymmetric Firms," Other publications TiSEM 90dd8ebe-c992-44b4-bc5d-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:90dd8ebe-c992-44b4-bc5d-27891cec3389
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    1. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jose Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2007. "Blowing the Whistle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 143-166, April.
    4. J.J. Graafland & H. Smid, 2004. "Reputation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Market Regulation," Review of Business and Economic Literature, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Review of Business and Economic Literature, vol. 0(2), pages 271-308.
    5. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June.
    6. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    7. repec:bla:jecsur:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:267-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
    9. Garoupa, Nuno, 2001. "Optimal magnitude and probability of fines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1765-1771, October.
    10. Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2008. "Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 189(1), pages 269-291, August.
    2. Leliefeld, D. & Motchenkova, E., 2007. "To Protect in Order to Serve : Adverse Effects of Leniency Programs in View of Industry Asymmetry," Discussion Paper 2007-007, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    3. Zhou, Jun, 2011. "Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 353, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    5. Catherine ROUX & Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 2007. "Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 07.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    6. Brenner, Steffen, 2009. "An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 639-645, November.
    7. Hoang, Cung Truong & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Smuda, Florian, 2014. "Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 15-23.

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