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A "mistaken theories" refinement

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  • Suehiro, H.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Suehiro, H., 1992. "A "mistaken theories" refinement," Other publications TiSEM 36cc87ee-3c13-4e91-85e0-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:36cc87ee-3c13-4e91-85e0-64833c1f3106
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/1152017/HS5620771.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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