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Who pays for Banking Supervision?

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  • Prast, H.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Prast, H.M., 2007. "Who pays for Banking Supervision?," Other publications TiSEM 2ef7a617-610e-4d00-a072-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2ef7a617-610e-4d00-a072-f14eb2def9a9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why Do Politicians Delegate?," NBER Working Papers 11531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-212, May.
    3. Mr. Udaibir S Das & Mr. Marc G Quintyn, 2002. "Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance," IMF Working Papers 2002/163, International Monetary Fund.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    5. Mr. Michael W Taylor & Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Ms. Silvia Ramirez, 2007. "The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 2007/025, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, 2003. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 49(2), pages 259-294.
    7. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Working Papers 238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    8. Mr. Richard K. Abrams & Mr. Michael W Taylor, 2000. "Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 2000/213, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Merton, Robert C., 1995. "Financial innovation and the management and regulation of financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 461-481, June.
    10. Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Mr. Michael W Taylor, 2004. "Should Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent?," IMF Economic Issues 2004/001, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Barth, James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "The regulation and supervision of banks around the world - a new database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2588, The World Bank.
    12. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2001. "Law, politics, and finance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2585, The World Bank.
    13. Marc G Quintyn & Michael W Taylor, 2004. "Should Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent?," IMF Economic Issues 32, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Repullo, Rafael, 2000. "Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 580-605, August.
    15. Kane, Edward J, 1990. "Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-764, July.
    16. Mr. Udaibir S Das & Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Miss Kina Chenard, 2004. "Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System Stability? An Empirical Analysis," IMF Working Papers 2004/089, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Donato Masciandaro, 2006. "E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 73-102, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Florian Buck & Eva Schliephake, 2012. "The Regulator's Trade-off: Bank Supervision vs. Minimum Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series 3923, CESifo.
    2. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2012. "Political Economy of Banking Regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62018, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2013. "The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4584-4598.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Maria J. Nieto & Marc Quintyn, 2011. "Will They Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Athanassiou, Phoebus, 2011. "Financial sector supervisors' accountability: a european perspective," Legal Working Paper Series 12, European Central Bank.
    6. Masciandaro, Donato & Nieto, Maria J. & Quintyn, Marc, 2011. "Exploring governance of the new European Banking AuthorityâA case for harmonization?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 204-214, December.
    7. Richard Brophy, 2012. "Development of insurance regulation in Ireland," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 20(3), pages 248-263, July.

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