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On the Role of Commitment in a Class of Signaling Problems

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  • Jost, P.-J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Jost, P.-J., 1994. "On the Role of Commitment in a Class of Signaling Problems," Other publications TiSEM 1a12c57c-47e9-45ec-9c19-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:1a12c57c-47e9-45ec-9c19-21dedc5dddd6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-1797, November.
    2. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1984. "Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 447-470, Winter.
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