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Incentive effects of performance-vested stock options

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  • Kuang, Y.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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Suggested Citation

  • Kuang, Y., 2007. "Incentive effects of performance-vested stock options," Other publications TiSEM 18dd1758-4773-426f-98f3-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:18dd1758-4773-426f-98f3-d32653d455a5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February.
    2. António Câmara, 2001. "The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(9‐10), pages 1115-1139, November.
    3. Conyon, Martin J & Murphy, Kevin J, 2000. "The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages 640-671, November.
    4. Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian, 2005. "Offering stock options to gauge managerial talent," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 189-210, December.
    5. Hirst, Mark K. & Lowy, Steven M., 1990. "The linear additive and interactive effects of budgetary goal difficulty and feedback on performance," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 425-436.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    7. Hemmer, Thomas & Kim, Oliver & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1999. "Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 307-327, December.
    8. Barron, John M. & Waddell, Glen R., 2003. "Executive rank, pay and project selection," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 305-349, February.
    9. Jenter, Dirk, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk," Working papers 4466-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    10. António Câmara, 2001. "The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(9‐10), pages 1115-1139, November.
    11. Burns, Natasha & Kedia, Simi, 2006. "The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 35-67, January.
    12. Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df & Verrecchia, Re, 1991. "Portfolio Considerations In Valuing Executive-Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 129-149.
    13. António Câmara, 2001. "The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(9&10), pages 1115-1139.
    14. James Dow & Clara C. Raposo, 2005. "CEO Compensation, Change, and Corporate Strategy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2701-2727, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Sauset & Phillip Waller & Michael Wolff, 2015. "CEO Contract Design Regulation and Risk-Taking," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 685-725, December.
    2. Eiling, E., 2007. "Essays on International Finance and Asset Pricing," Other publications TiSEM 5f891179-600e-4965-a5eb-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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