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Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk : International Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Anginer, D.
  • Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
  • Huizinga, H.P.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Ma, K.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

This paper finds that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is positively associated with bank insolvency risk, as proxied by the Z-score and the Merton's distance to default measure, for an international sample of banks over the 2004-08 period. Banks are special in that"good"corporate governance increases bank insolvency risk relatively more for banks that are large and located in countries with sound public finances, as banks aim to exploit the financial safety net. Good corporate governance is specifically associated with higher asset volatility, more nonperforming loans, and a lower tangible capital ratio. Furthermore, good corporate governance is associated with more bank risk-taking at times of rapid economic expansion. Consistent with increased risk-taking, good corporate governance is associated with a higher valuation of the implicit insurance provided by the financial safety net, especially in the case of large banks. These results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail policies in encouraging excessive risk-taking by banks.
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Suggested Citation

  • Anginer, D. & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, H.P. & Ma, K., 2014. "Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk : International Evidence," Discussion Paper 2014-053, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:3da1df9f-1cbe-4a14-91be-ffc96c88c0d1
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    Cited by:

    1. Harkin, S.M. & Mare, D.S. & Crook, J.N., 2020. "Independence in bank governance structure: Empirical evidence of effects on bank risk and performance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    2. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Horváth, Bálint L. & Huizinga, Harry, 2017. "How does long-term finance affect economic volatility?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 41-59.
    3. Rusmanto, Toto & Soedarmono, Wahyoe & Tarazi, Amine, 2020. "Credit information sharing in the nexus between charter value and systemic risk in Asian banking," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    4. Alin Marius Andries & Martin Brown, 2017. "Credit booms and busts in emerging markets," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 25(3), pages 377-437, July.
    5. Bushman, Robert M. & Davidson, Robert H. & Dey, Aiyesha & Smith, Abbie, 2018. "Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls, culture and tail risk," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 191-220.
    6. Samar Jameel Kalyal & Dawood Ashraf & Asfia Obaid, 2019. "The Role of Stability and Ownership Structure in Determining the Efficiency of US Bank Holding Companies," Business & Economic Review, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan, vol. 11(2), pages 19-44, June.
    7. Addo, Kwabena Aboah & Hussain, Nazim & Iqbal, Jamshed, 2021. "Corporate Governance and Banking Systemic Risk: A Test of the Bundling Hypothesis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    8. Horváth, Bálint L., 2020. "The interaction of bank regulation and taxation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    9. Yomna Daoud & Aida Kammoun, 2020. "Financial Stability and Bank Capital: The Case of Islamic Banks," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 10(5), pages 361-369.
    10. René M. Stulz, 2022. "Risk‐Taking and Risk Management by Banks," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 34(1), pages 95-105, March.
    11. Safiullah, Md & Shamsuddin, Abul, 2018. "Risk in Islamic banking and corporate governance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 129-149.
    12. Bushman, Robert M., 2014. "Thoughts on financial accounting and the banking industry," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 384-395.
    13. René M. Stulz, 2015. "Risk-Taking and Risk Management by Banks," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 27(1), pages 8-18, March.
    14. Andrzej R. Stopczyński, 2020. "Banki na progu upadłości – refleksje nad postępowaniem," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 51(5), pages 517-548.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Bank insolvency; Capitalization; Non-performing loans;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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