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Insuring product markets

Author

Listed:
  • Jeroen (J.) Hinloopen

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Lting Zhou

    (Tinbergen Institute)

Abstract

We formally link insurance markets with product markets and identify a demand effect of insurance: if risk-averse consumers can buy insurance against possible product failure, there will be some additional consumers that buy the product because they can also purchase protection. The concomitant upward pressure on price is further fueled by those consumers that have a higher willingness to pay if they can also buy insurance. But a higher price causes those consumers to leave the market that would have bought the product absent insurance. Introducing insurance thus has an ambiguous effect on price, consumers' surplus, and total surplus.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeroen (J.) Hinloopen & Lting Zhou, 2018. "Insuring product markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-090/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180090
    as

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    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/18090.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harris Schlesinger & Emilio Venezian, 1986. "Insurance Markets with Loss-Prevention Activity: Profits, Market Structure, and Consumer Welfare," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 227-238, Summer.
    2. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    3. Boulding, William & Kirmani, Amna, 1993. "A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 20(1), pages 111-123, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    product failure; insured loss; insurance; product markets; demand effect of insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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