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The effects of macroeconomic institutions on economic performance in a general equilibrium model

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  • Cuciniello Vincenzo

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relation between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money a la Neiss (1999), and public expenditure financed by means of a distortive tax. It focuses on how macroeconomic institutions may affect output, inflation and taxation when monetary and fiscal policies strategically interact in presence of monopolistic distortions in labor markets. It is shown that, with pre determined wage setting, fiscal and monetary policy are subject to a time inconsistency problem, and the equilibrium rate of inflation is above the Friedman rule while the equilibrium tax rate is below the efficient level. In particular, the discretionary rate of inflation is nonmonotonically related to the natural output, positively related to government size, and negatively related to conservatism. Finally, a regime with commitment is always welfare improving over a regime with discretion.

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  • Cuciniello Vincenzo, 2008. "The effects of macroeconomic institutions on economic performance in a general equilibrium model," wp.comunite 0036, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0036
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