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Interlocking directorates as a trust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry

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  • Carbonai Davide
  • Di Bartolomeo Giovanni

Abstract

This paper investigates the market structure of the insurance business by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created by their directors. We focus on the non-life business since this is a sector relatively closed with respect to the competition with other financial activities; an absence of industry competition cannot thus be compensated by other agents. We apply the graph theory to describe the network and the principal component analysis to summarize information and verify the correlation between direct interlocking and companies’ market shares.

Suggested Citation

  • Carbonai Davide & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2006. "Interlocking directorates as a trust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry," wp.comunite 0001, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0001
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Bartolomeo & Paolo Canofari, 2015. "Interlocking Directorates and Concentration in the Italian Insurance Market," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 351-362, December.
    2. Di Bartolomeo Anna & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2007. "Integration of migrants in Italy: A simple general and objective measure," wp.comunite 0010, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    3. Maria Rosa Battaggion & Vittoria Cerasi, 2018. "Endogenous interlocking directorates," Working Papers 380, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 01 May 2018.
    4. Davide Carbonai & Carlo Drago, 2015. "Positive Freedom in Networked Capitalism: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 2015.75, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-life insurance; antitrust; competition; interlocking directorates; network economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

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