IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tcr/wpaper/e115.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The dynamical stability for an evolutionary language game under selection-mutation dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Seigo Uchida
  • Masakazu Fukuzumi

Abstract

We present complete results pertaining to the dynamical stability for sender-receiver games following Lewis (1969), and Nowak and Krakauer (1999) under the selection-mutation dynamics. Our research reveals that two distinct classes of neutrally stable strategies have a distinguishing feature of the dynamic stability. The rest points close to the strategies of these classes are asymptotically stable and all rest points other than these are not.

Suggested Citation

  • Seigo Uchida & Masakazu Fukuzumi, 2017. "The dynamical stability for an evolutionary language game under selection-mutation dynamics," Working Papers e115, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e115
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.tcer.or.jp/wp/pdf/e115.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Josef Hofbauer & Simon M. Huttegger, 2015. "Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, January.
    2. Pawlowitsch, Christina, 2008. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 203-226, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Seigo Uchida, 2019. "Efficiency and stability in sender-receiver games under the selection-mutation dynamics," Working Papers e132, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    2. Josef Hofbauer & Simon M. Huttegger, 2015. "Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, January.
    3. Simon M. Huttegger & Kevin J. S. Zollman, 2016. "The Robustness of Hybrid Equilibria in Costly Signaling Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 347-358, September.
    4. Penélope Hernández & Bernhard von Stengel, 2014. "Nash Codes for Noisy Channels," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1221-1235, December.
    5. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    6. Geoffrey Hodgson & Kainan Huang, 2012. "Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics: are they different species?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 345-366, April.
    7. Jason McKenzie Alexander & Brian Skyrms & Sandy Zabell, 2012. "Inventing New Signals," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 129-145, March.
    8. K.J.M. De Jaegher & R. van Rooij, 2011. "Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests," Working Papers 11-25, Utrecht School of Economics.
    9. Ross Cressman & William Sandholm & Christine Taylor, 2012. "Preface: Second DGAA Special Issue on Evolutionary Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-3, March.
    10. Roland Mühlenbernd & Sławomir Wacewicz & Przemysław Żywiczyński, 2022. "The Evolution of Ambiguity in Sender—Receiver Signaling Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-19, February.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tctokjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.