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Reaction Functions of Bank of England MPC Members: Insiders versus Outsiders

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  • Christopher Spencer

    (University of Surrey)

Abstract

In 1997, the Bank of England was granted operational responsibility for setting interest rates to meet a Government inflation target of RPIX 2.5 percent. As part of the shift towards independence, operational decisions on monetary policy were delegated to a Monetary Policy Committee. Using voting data obtained from Minutes of Monetary Policy Committee Meetings, I show that as a group, internally appointed MPC members (insiders) on average prefer higher interest rates than external appointees (outsiders). Further, ordered logit analysis demonstrates that insiders and outsiders are motivated by different concerns when setting interest rates, with the interest rate setting behaviour of outsiders being less easy to predict than those of insiders.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Spencer, 2006. "Reaction Functions of Bank of England MPC Members: Insiders versus Outsiders," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0606, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    • Handle: RePEc:sur:surrec:0606
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Budd, Alan, 1998. "The Role and Operations of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(451), pages 1783-1794, November.
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    4. Ellen E. Meade & Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Henry W. Chappell & Thomas M. Havrilesky & Rob Roy McGregor, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218.
    6. Geraats, Petra M., 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt0hw7h7cp, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    7. John G. Cragg & Russell S. Uhler, 1970. "The Demand for Automobiles," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 3(3), pages 386-406, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2008. "Delayed doves: MPC voting behaviour of externals," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19611, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Jakub Borowski & Adam Czerniak, 2012. "Determinanty polityki pieniężnej Ludowego Banku Chin," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1-2, pages 97-116.
    3. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Gerlach-Kristen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2013. "Monetary policy decisions – comparing theory and “inside” information from MPC members," Working Paper 2013/03, Norges Bank.
    4. Berk, Jan Marc & Bierut, Beata K., 2011. "Communication in a monetary policy committee," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 791-801.
    5. Alexander Jung & Gergely Kiss, 2012. "Voting by monetary policy committees: evidence from the CEE inflation-targeting countries," MNB Working Papers 2012/2, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
    6. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
    7. Jung, Alexander & Kiss, Gergely, 2012. "Preference heterogeneity in the CEE inflation-targeting countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 445-460.
    8. Timothy Besley & Neil Meads & Paolo Surico, 2008. "Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 218-223, May.
    9. Jan Marc Berk & Beata Bierut & Ellen E. Meade, 2010. "The Dynamic Voting Patterns of the Bank of England's MPC," Working Papers 2010-17, American University, Department of Economics.
    10. Attila Csajbók, 2008. "The use of staff policy recommendations in central banks," MNB Working Papers 2008/4, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
    11. Brooks, Robert & Harris, Mark & Spencer, Christopher, 2007. "An Inflated Ordered Probit Model of Monetary Policy: Evidence from MPC Voting Data," MPRA Paper 8509, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Jakub Borowski & Adam Czerniak & Krystian Jaworski, 2014. "The quest for determinants of Chinese exchange rate policy," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 45(5), pages 407�432-4.
    13. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2015. "Monetary Policy Committees: Comparing Theory and "Inside" Information from MPC Members," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 47-89, December.
    14. Christopher Spencer, 2006. "The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Members," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0306, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

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    Keywords

    Monetary Policy Committee; insiders; outsiders; voting;
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