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Intellectual Property Rights and Market Dynamics

Author

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  • Fabrizio Cesaroni
  • Paola Giuri

Abstract

Two opposite models are currently operating in the modern economy, the strong intellectual property rights (IPR) model, and the open source/open science model. They have traditionally been applied to alternative institutional contexts. The strong IPR model has been associated to the business environment, while the open science model has been associated to the academic or research system. More recently, a strengthening of the IPR system has occurred in the public research system, and open science models have been adopted in private sectors like the open source software. This paper discusses these different models and their implications on the innovative activity of firms and economies, and the market dynamics. One of the main benefits deriving from a strong IPR system is that it encourages the entry of new technology-based firms and the commercialisation of technologies in markets for technologies. At the same time, an increased patent protection is also associated to potential costs, such as those arising from a excessive fragmentation of property rights, an abuse of patent protection for strategic reasons (sleeping and blocking patents), and an increase in litigation costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Cesaroni & Paola Giuri, 2005. "Intellectual Property Rights and Market Dynamics," LEM Papers Series 2005/10, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2005/10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ashish Arora & Andrea Fosfuri & Alfonso Gambardella, 2004. "Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262511819, April.
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    4. Arora, Ashish & Fosfuri, Andrea, 2003. "Licensing the market for technology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 277-295, October.
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    6. Fabrizio Cesaroni, 2003. "Technology Strategies in the Knowledge Economy: The Licensing Activity of Himont," International Journal of Innovation Management (ijim), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(02), pages 223-245.
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    Cited by:

    1. Isabelle Liotard, 2007. "Les nouvelles facettes de la propriété intellectuelle : stratégies, attaques et menaces," Post-Print hal-00196848, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intellectual Property Rights; Patents; Patent Policy; Open Science; Open Source Software; Technology Commercialisation and Diffusion;
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