IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/sps/cpaper/10455.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.
  • Gubar, Elena A.
  • Zhitkova, Ekaterina M.
  • Kurnosykh, Zlata
  • Skovorodina, Tatiana

Abstract

Collected papers presented on the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. Ó SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2017. Ó 404 p.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumacheva, Suriya Sh. & Gubar, Elena A. & Zhitkova, Ekaterina M. & Kurnosykh, Zlata & Skovorodina, Tatiana, 2017. "Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach," Conference Papers 10455, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:sps:cpaper:10455
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dspace.spbu.ru/handle/11701/10455
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elena Gubar & Edgar Javier Sanchez Carrera & Suriya Kumacheva & Ekaterina Zhitkova & Galina Tomilina, 2018. "Games and Network Structures on Corruption, Income Inequality, and Tax Control," Working Papers 1808, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2018.
    2. Wang, Mengyao & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2020. "The effect of individual attitude on cooperation in social dilemma," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 555(C).
    3. Wang, Mengyao & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2020. "Individuals with the firm heart are conducive to cooperation in social dilemma," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    4. da Silva Rocha, André Barreira & Salomão, Gabriel Meyer, 2019. "Environmental policy regulation and corporate compliance in evolutionary game models with well-mixed and structured populations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(2), pages 486-501.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax audit; tax evasion; total tax revenue; information spreading; evolutionary game on networks;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sps:cpaper:10455. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lena Manaeva (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sompuru.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.