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The Impact of Technology Licensing Payment Mechanisms on Firms' Innovative Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Jung Eun Lee
  • Younghoon Kim
  • Yeonbae Kim

    (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), Seoul National University)

  • Donghyuk Choi

    (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), Seoul National University)

Abstract

Although numerous papers have examined the ways in which firms can improve their innovative performance through technology alliances, empirical research on the effect of contract structures in technology licensing has been scarce. This study provides evidence that the payment mechanisms agreed upon in licensing contracts affect the licensee firms¡¯ innovative performance. Based on a dataset of technology licensing contracts concluded by small- and medium-sized enterprises around the world, this paper analyzes the influence of fixed-fee payments and ongoing payments?including royalty, milestone, and equity payments?on firm performance. The findings reveal that ongoing payments are more likely to positively influence the innovative performance of licensee firms. The results also suggest that equity grants to the licensor would not impact the licensee¡¯s performance as much as fixed-fee payments. These outcomes provide crucial insights into the ways in which small high-tech firms can utilize their external technology resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Jung Eun Lee & Younghoon Kim & Yeonbae Kim & Donghyuk Choi, 2010. "The Impact of Technology Licensing Payment Mechanisms on Firms' Innovative Performance," TEMEP Discussion Papers 201071, Seoul National University; Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), revised Dec 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:snv:dp2009:201071
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Arman Yalvac Aksoy & Catherine Beaudry, 2021. "How are companies paying for university research licenses? Empirical evidence from university-firm technology transfer," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 46(6), pages 2051-2121, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Technology licensing; payment mechanism; innovative performance; small-and-medium-sized enterprises.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions

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