IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/shf/wpaper/2023018.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the Unimportance of Commitment for Monetary Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Paez-Farrell

    (Department of Economics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S1 4DT, UK)

Abstract

In a New Keynesian model where the trade-off between stabilising the aggregate inflation rate and the output gap arises from sectoral asymmetries, the gains from commitment are either zero or negligible. Thus, to the extent that economic fluctu- ations are caused by sectoral shocks, policies designed to overcome the stabilisation bias are aiming to correct an unimportant problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Paez-Farrell, 2023. "On the Unimportance of Commitment for Monetary Policy," Working Papers 2023018, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:shf:wpaper:2023018
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/economics/research/serps
    File Function: First version, August 18 2023
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carl Walsh, 2003. "Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 265-278, March.
    2. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    3. Coenen Günter & Orphanides Athanasios & Wieland Volker, 2004. "Price Stability and Monetary Policy Effectiveness when Nominal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-25, February.
    4. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    5. Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2004. "Optimal monetary policy in a currency area," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 293-320, July.
    6. Liu, Philip, 2010. "Stabilization bias for a small open economy: The case of New Zealand," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 921-935, September.
    7. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe & Ellen R. McGrattan, 2009. "New Keynesian Models: Not Yet Useful for Policy Analysis," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 242-266, January.
    8. Levine, Paul & McAdam, Peter & Pearlman, Joseph, 2008. "Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from monetary commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 1253-1276, October.
    9. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 928-956, September.
    10. Veronica Guerrieri & Guido Lorenzoni & Ludwig Straub & Iván Werning, 2022. "Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1437-1474, May.
    11. Aoki, Kosuke, 2001. "Optimal monetary policy responses to relative-price changes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 55-80, August.
    12. Liu, Zheng & Pappa, Evi, 2008. "Gains from international monetary policy coordination: Does it pay to be different?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 2085-2117, July.
    13. Fornaro, Luca & Romei, Federica, 2022. "Monetary Policy during Unbalanced Global Recoveries," CEPR Discussion Papers 16971, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Dennis, Richard & Soderstrom, Ulf, 2006. "How Important Is Precommitment for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 847-872, June.
    15. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2005. "Inflation Stabilization And Welfare: The Case Of A Distorted Steady State," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1185-1236, December.
    16. Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1998. "An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy: Expanded Version," NBER Technical Working Papers 0233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Lees, Kirdan, 2007. "How large are the gains to commitment policy and optimal delegation for New Zealand?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 959-975, December.
    18. Fuhrer, Jeffrey C & Moore, George R, 1995. "Monetary Policy Trade-offs and the Correlation between Nominal Interest Rates and Real Output," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 219-239, March.
    19. Filippo Ferroni & Stefano Grassi & Miguel A. Leon-Ledesma, 2015. "Fundamental shock selection in DSGE models," Studies in Economics 1508, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    20. Paez-Farrell, Juan, 2012. "Should central bankers discount the future? A note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 20-22.
    21. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    22. Tillmann, Peter, 2009. "The stabilization bias and robust monetary policy delegation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 730-734, December.
    23. Frank Smets & Raf Wouters, 2003. "An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1123-1175, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dennis, Richard & Soderstrom, Ulf, 2006. "How Important Is Precommitment for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 847-872, June.
    2. Chen, Xiaoshan & Kirsanova, Tatiana & Leith, Campbell, 2014. "An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-04, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    3. Ricardo Nunes & Jinill Kim & Jesper Linde & Davide Debortoli, 2014. "Designing a Simple Loss Function for the Fed: Does the Dual Mandate Make Sense?," 2014 Meeting Papers 1043, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Duncan, Alfred J. M. & Nolan, Charles, 2019. "Disputes, debt and equity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
    5. Chen, Xiaoshan & Kirsanova, Tatiana & Leith, Campbell, 2014. "An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-04, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Wieland, Volker & Binder, Michael & Lieberknecht, Philipp & Quintana, Jorge, 2017. "Model Uncertainty in Macroeconomics: On the Implications of Financial Frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 12013, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Dennis, Richard, 2014. "Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 218-234.
    8. Richard Dennis, 2007. "Model uncertainty and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2007-09, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    9. Wieland, Volker & Cwik, Tobias & Müller, Gernot J. & Schmidt, Sebastian & Wolters, Maik, 2012. "A new comparative approach to macroeconomic modeling and policy analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 523-541.
    10. Sevim Kosem Alp, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Sectoral Heterogeneity in Inflation Persistence (Sektorel Enflasyon Ataleti Farkliligi Altinda Optimal Para Politikasi)," Working Papers 1004, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
    11. Loisel, Olivier, 2008. "Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(11), pages 3718-3742, November.
    12. Davide Debortoli & Jinill Kim & Jesper Lindé & Ricardo Nunes, 2019. "Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks: Does a Dual Mandate Make Sense?," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2010-2038.
    13. Chen, Xiaoshan & Kirsanova, Tatiana & Leith, Campbell, 2017. "How optimal is US monetary policy?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 96-111.
    14. Ida, Daisuke, 2020. "Sectoral inflation persistence and optimal monetary policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    15. Gregory E. Givens, 2012. "Estimating Central Bank Preferences under Commitment and Discretion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(6), pages 1033-1061, September.
    16. Dennis, Richard & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2010. "Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures: Selecting among Multiple Discretionary Equilibria," MPRA Paper 24616, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Yuan, Huiping & Miller, Stephen M., 2010. "Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 737-745, May.
    18. Ivan Petrella & Emiliano Santoro, "undated". "Optimal Monetary Policy with Durable Consumption Goods and Factor Demand Linkages," EPRU Working Paper Series 2009-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised May 2009.
    19. Dennis, Richard, 2010. "How robustness can lower the cost of discretion," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(6), pages 653-667, September.
    20. Liu, Philip, 2010. "Stabilization bias for a small open economy: The case of New Zealand," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 921-935, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal monetary policy; stabilization bias; discretion; commitment; inflation target;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:shf:wpaper:2023018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mike Crabtree (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/desheuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.