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Games Equilibria and the Variational Representation of Preferences

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In this paper we consider a model of games of incomplete information under ambiguity in which players are endowed with variational preferences. We provide an existence result for the corresponding mixed equilibrium notion. Then we study the limit behavior of equilibria under perturbations on the indices of ambiguity aversion.

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  • Giuseppe De Marco & Maria Romaniello, 2013. "Games Equilibria and the Variational Representation of Preferences," CSEF Working Papers 336, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:336
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    1. Lars Peter Hansen & Thomas J Sargent, 2014. "Robust Control and Model Uncertainty," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: UNCERTAINTY WITHIN ECONOMIC MODELS, chapter 5, pages 145-154, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Giuseppe De Marco & Maria Romaniello, 2013. "On the Stability of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games under Ambiguity," CSEF Working Papers 332, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    4. Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2006. "Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1447-1498, November.
    5. De Marco, Giuseppe & Romaniello, Maria, 2013. "A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 431-438.
    6. Jacqueline Morgan & Vincenzo Scalzo, 2008. "Variational Stability Of Social Nash Equilibria," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(01), pages 17-24.
    7. Stauber, Ronald, 2011. "Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 248-274, January.
    8. Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2005. "Random belief equilibrium in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 296-323, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Bich, 2016. "Prudent Equilibria and Strategic Uncertainty in Discontinuous Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01337293, HAL.
    2. Philippe Bich, 2016. "Prudent Equilibria and Strategic Uncertainty in Discontinuous Games," Working Papers halshs-01337293, HAL.
    3. Giuseppe De Marco & Maria Romaniello, 2014. "Variational Preferences and Equilibria in Games under Ambiguous Beliefs Correspondences," CSEF Working Papers 363, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Bich, Philippe, 2019. "Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 786-822.

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    Keywords

    Incomplete information games; multiple priors; variational preferences; equilibria;
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