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Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Author

Listed:
  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
  • Martin Dufwenberg
  • Stefano Papa
  • Francesco Passarelli

Abstract

Messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements in a game with pre-play bilateral communication. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Martin Dufwenberg & Stefano Papa & Francesco Passarelli, 2022. "Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication," Working Papers in Public Economics 229, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    • Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp229
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2017. "Honesty and informal agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 269-285.
    2. Judd B. Kessler & Stephen Leider, 2012. "Norms and Contracting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 62-77, January.
    3. Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Dufwenberg, Martin & Papa, Stefano & Passarelli, Francesco, 2019. "Promises, expectations & causation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 137-146.
    4. Christoph Vanberg, 2008. "Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1467-1480, November.
    5. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    6. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Charness, Gary & Bartolomeo, Giovanni Di & Papa, Stefano, 2024. "A stranger in a strange land: Promises and identity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 13-28.
    2. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2023. "Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 690-717.
    3. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Martin Dufwenberg & Stefano Papa, 2023. "Promises and partner-switch," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(1), pages 77-89, June.
    4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Feldman, Paul & Servátka, Maroš & Tarrasó, Jorge & Vadovič, Radovan, 2023. "Honesty in the city," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 15-25.
      • Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Tarrasó, Jorge & Vadovič, Radovan, 2021. "Honesty in the City," MPRA Paper 106256, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Martin Dufwenberg & Paul Feldman & Maros Servatka & Jorge Tarraso & Radovan Vadovic, 2022. "Honesty in the City," Working Papers 2022-03, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
      • Dufwenberg, Martin & Feldman, Paul & Servátka, Maroš & Tarrasó, Jorge & Vadovič, Radovan, 2022. "Honesty in the city," MPRA Paper 115044, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Guilt aversion; promise-keeping; informal agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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