IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rut/rutres/202402.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Underinvestment and Capital Misallocation Under Sovereign Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Esquivel

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

Capital and its sectoral allocation affect default incentives. Under general assumptions, default risk is decreasing in the total stock of capital and increasing in the share of capital allocated to non-tradable production. This implies that when competitive households make all investment decisions capital has two externalities: a capital-stock externality and a portfolio externality. These hamper the ability of a benevolent government to make optimal borrowing and default decisions and are exacerbated during periods of distress. Competitive equilibria feature underinvestment, larger non-traded sectors, more default, and lower debt and consumption than a centralized planner's allocation. Select number of author(s): : 1

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Esquivel, 2024. "Underinvestment and Capital Misallocation Under Sovereign Risk," Departmental Working Papers 202402, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:202402
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2024-02.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    2. Arce, Fernando, 2021. "Private Overborrowing under Sovereign Risk," MPRA Paper 113176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Esquivel, Carlos, 2024. "Underinvestment and capital misallocation under sovereign risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    2. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
    3. Cornand, Camille & Gandré, Pauline & Gimet, Céline, 2016. "Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 445-469.
    4. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-95 debt crisis," Staff Report 210, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    5. Aguiar, M. & Chatterjee, S. & Cole, H. & Stangebye, Z., 2016. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1697-1755, Elsevier.
    6. Polito, Vito & Wickens, Michael, 2015. "Sovereign credit ratings in the European Union: A model-based fiscal analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 220-247.
    7. Falko Juessen & Andreas Schabert, 2013. "Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Default, and Bailouts," Working Paper Series in Economics 67, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    8. Romei, Federica & de Ferra, Sergio, 2018. "Sovereign Default in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 12976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Government policy and the probability of coordination failures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 939-973, May.
    10. Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2020. "When the penny doesn't drop - Macroeconomic tail risk and currency crises," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 520, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    11. Alessandro Dovis & Luigi Bocola, 2015. "Indeterminacy in Sovereign Debt Markets: An Empirical Investigation," 2015 Meeting Papers 694, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Timothy J. Kehoe, 2003. "What Can We Learn from the Current Crisis in Argentina?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(5), pages 609-633, November.
    13. Illenin Kondo & Sewon Hur, 2011. "A Theory of Optimal Reserves Allocation and Sudden Stops in Emerging Economies," 2011 Meeting Papers 1105, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Leandro Andrián & Oscar Mauricio Valencia, 2023. "Past the Tipping Point? Assessing Debt Overhang in Latin America and the Caribbean," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 8, pages 183-196, Inter-American Development Bank.
    15. Emmanuel Farhi & Matteo Maggiori, 2018. "A Model of the International Monetary System," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(1), pages 295-355.
    16. Andrade, Sandro C. & Kohlscheen, Emanuel, 2010. "Pessimistic Foreign Investors and Turmoil in Emerging Markets : The Case of Brazil in 2002," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 926, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    17. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    18. Giancarlo Corsetti & Aitor Erce & Timothy Uy, 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies During the Euro Area Crisis," Discussion Papers 1720, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    19. Aghion, Philippe & Bacchetta, Philippe & Banerjee, Abhijit, 2004. "A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 6-30, November.
    20. Fernando A. Broner & Guido Lorenzoni & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2013. "Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 67-100, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Soveriegn default; Underinvestment; Investment externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:202402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/derutus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.