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Value Added Tax Evasion, Auditing and Transactions Matching

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Listed:
  • Ira N. Gang

    (Rutgers University)

  • Arindam Das-Gupta

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

This paper extends the standard theoretical model of tax enforcement by allowing for the cross- matching of transactions in addition to the auditing of taxpayers. For the Value Added Tax (VAT) the matching of purchase and sales invoices is an important enforcement technique. The paper examines the impact such enforcement on the revenue effectiveness and efficiency consequences of the VAT. Transactions matching is shown to have very different effects from auditing: Even when auditing alone is unable to induce non-zero taxpayer reports, and regardless of the expected success rate in auditing of the tax administration, sufficiently intensive cross- matching can induce truthful reporting. On the other hand, matching leads to distorted purchase and sales transactions. It can also distort input use and output decisions even if auditing alone has no adverse effects. In the model, conditions under which the VAT leaves input prices undistorted are found and the content of the often made claim, that a VAT is self-enforcing, is explored. The ability of the tax administration to enforce compliance with the VAT is shown to be sensitive to the knowledge that the tax administration has about the production technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Ira N. Gang & Arindam Das-Gupta, 1998. "Value Added Tax Evasion, Auditing and Transactions Matching," Departmental Working Papers 199607, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:199607
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    File URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/1996-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Mr. Alan A. Tait, 1991. "Value-Added Tax: Administrative and Policy Issues," IMF Occasional Papers 1991/011, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arindam Das-Gupta, 2005. "With non-competitive firms, a turnover tax can dominate the VAT," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(9), pages 1-6.
    2. Das-Gupta, Arindam, 2004. "VAT versus the turnover tax with non-competitive firms," Working Papers 04/21, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    3. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2010. "Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 374-385, May.
    4. Watanabe, Satoshi, 2001. "Electronic Commerce and Indirect Taxation," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 52(1), pages 40-51, January.
    5. Alejandro Esteller-More, 2004. "Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes," Public Economics 0401001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Dina Pomeranz, 2015. "No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2539-2569, August.

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