IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rtv/ceisrp/548.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Inter-municipal Cooperation in Public Procurement

Author

Listed:
  • Giampaolo Arachi

    (Università del Salento)

  • Debora Assisi

    (Università di Bari)

  • Berardino Cesi

    (DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata")

  • Michele G. Giuranno

    (Università del Salento)

  • Felice Russo

    (Università del Salento)

Abstract

This paper assesses the effects of intermunicipal cooperation on public procurement (PP) performance, based on the Italian experience. We estimate a fixed effect regression model using a sample of 50,905 Italian public works contracts awarded both by municipalities and by municipal unions (MU) from 2012 to 2021. Results prove MU are more efficient than single municipalities at the execution, rather than the winning stage, of the tender. Public tenders awarded by MU show lower winning rebates, shorter delivery delays and, for less complex works, lower final execution extra costs. Furthermore, we investigate whether intergovernmental transfers may enhance PP performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Giampaolo Arachi & Debora Assisi & Berardino Cesi & Michele G. Giuranno & Felice Russo, 2022. "Inter-municipal Cooperation in Public Procurement," CEIS Research Paper 548, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 19 Dec 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:548
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ceistorvergata.it/RePEc/rpaper/RP548.pdf
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro & Calogero Guccio & Ilde Rizzo, 2014. "An assessment of the waste effects of corruption on infrastructure provision," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(4), pages 813-843, August.
    2. Edoardo Di Porto & Angela Parenti & Sonia Paty & Zineb Abidi, 2017. "Local government cooperation at work: a control function approach," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 435-463.
    3. Davide Luca & Felix Modrego, 2021. "Stronger together? Assessing the causal effect of inter‐municipal cooperation on the efficiency of small Italian municipalities," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 261-293, January.
    4. Francisco J. Arcelus & Pablo Arocena & Ferm�n Cabas�s & Pedro Pascual, 2015. "On the Cost-Efficiency of Service Delivery in Small Municipalities," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(9), pages 1469-1480, September.
    5. Francesco Decarolis, 2014. "Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 108-132, January.
    6. Massimiliano Ferraresi & Giuseppe Migali & Leonzio Rizzo, 2018. "Does intermunicipal cooperation promote efficiency gains? Evidence from Italian municipal unions," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 1017-1044, November.
    7. Christian Bergholz & Ivo Bischoff, 2018. "Local council members’ view on intermunicipal cooperation: does office-related self-interest matter?," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(12), pages 1624-1635, December.
    8. Olga Chiappinelli, 2020. "Decentralization And Public Procurement Performance: New Evidence From Italy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(2), pages 856-880, April.
    9. Guccio, Calogero & Pignataro, Giacomo & Rizzo, Ilde, 2014. "Do local governments do it better? Analysis of time performance in the execution of public works," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 237-252.
    10. Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Tommaso Valletti, 2009. "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1278-1308, September.
    11. Simona Baldi & Davide Vannoni, 2017. "The impact of centralization on pharmaceutical procurement prices: the role of institutional quality and corruption," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(3), pages 426-438, March.
    12. King, Gary & Nielsen, Richard, 2019. "Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(4), pages 435-454, October.
    13. Dimitri,Nicola & Piga,Gustavo & Spagnolo,Giancarlo (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Procurement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870733, January.
    14. Iacus, Stefano M. & King, Gary & Porro, Giuseppe, 2012. "Causal Inference without Balance Checking: Coarsened Exact Matching," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 1-24, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marina Cavalieri & Calogero Guccio & Domenico Lisi & Ilde Rizzo, 2020. "Does Institutional Quality Matter for Infrastructure Provision? A Non-parametric Analysis for Italian Municipalities," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(3), pages 521-562, November.
    2. Calogero Guccio & Domenico Lisi & Ilde Rizzo, 2019. "When the purchasing officer looks the other way: on the waste effects of debauched local environment in public works execution," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 205-236, September.
    3. Giuseppe F Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2017. "Understanding the procurement performance of local governments: A duration analysis of public works," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 35(5), pages 809-827, August.
    4. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Decentralization and Public Procurement Performance: New Evidence from Italy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 58(2), pages 856-880.
    5. Baldi, Simona & Bottasso, Anna & Conti, Maurizio & Piccardo, Chiara, 2016. "To bid or not to bid: That is the question: Public procurement, project complexity and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 89-106.
    6. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2021. "The Expediting Effect of Monitoring on Infrastructural Works. A Regression-Discontinuity Approach with Multiple Assignment Variables," Papers 2102.09625, arXiv.org.
    7. Ravenda, Diego & Giuranno, Michele G. & Valencia-Silva, Maika M. & Argiles-Bosch, Josep M. & García-Blandón, Josep, 2020. "The effects of mafia infiltration on public procurement performance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Giuseppe Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2014. "The effect of Regional Law 35/2011 on strategic public works," Studi e approfondimenti 521, Istituto Regionale per la Programmazione Economica della Toscana.
    9. Banaszewska, Monika & Bischoff, Ivo & Bode, Eva & Chodakowska, Aneta, 2022. "Does inter-municipal cooperation help improve local economic performance? – Evidence from Poland," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    10. Clémence Tricaud, 2019. "Better alone? Evidence on the costs of intermunicipal cooperation," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2019-12-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    11. repec:hal:journl:hal-03380333 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Audinga Baltrunaite & Tommaso Orlando & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2021. "The implementation of public works in Italy: institutional features and regional characteristics," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 659, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    13. Massimiliano Ferraresi & Gianluca Gucciardi & Leonzio Rizzo, 2017. "Does purchase centralization reduce public expenditure? Evidence from the Italian healthcare system," Working papers 66, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    14. Cavalieri, Marina & Guccio, Calogero & Rizzo, Ilde, 2017. "On the role of environmental corruption in healthcare infrastructures: An empirical assessment for Italy using DEA with truncated regression approach," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(5), pages 515-524.
    15. Anna Peta, 2017. "Public works procurement in the new code: a legal and economic assessment of the main measures," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 400, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    16. Clarissa Lotti & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2022. "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CEIS Research Paper 532, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 01 Feb 2022.
    17. de Leverano, Adriano & Baulia, Susmita, 2023. "A new indicator to implement effective spending review policies in the public procurement for standardized goods," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-063, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    18. Christophe Loussouarn & Carine Franc & Yann Videau & Julien Mousquès, 2021. "Can General Practitioners Be More Productive? The Impact of Teamwork and Cooperation with Nurses on GP Activities," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 680-698, March.
    19. Philipp vom Berge & Achim Schmillen, 2023. "Effects of mass layoffs on local employment—evidence from geo-referenced data," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 509-539.
    20. Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024. "Targeted Bidders in Government Tenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 11142, CESifo.
    21. Butler, Jeffrey V. & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2020. "Past performance and entry in procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 179-195.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public procurement; centralization; local cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:548. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Barbara Piazzi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csrotit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.