IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rtr/wpaper/0230.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Financial Contracts With Unobservable Investments

Author

Listed:
  • Mario Tirelli

Abstract

In this article we propose a security-design problem in which risk neutral entrepreneurs make unobservable investment decisions while employing the investment funds of risk-neutral out- side investor/creditor(s). Contracts are restricted to satisfy limited liability and monotonicity of the payment schedule. The model we present extends the classical one proposed by Innes (1990, Journal of Economic Theory 52, 47-67) along two main directions: agents' decisions may be re-stricted by their initial capital and outside financial opportunities; and their investment decisions may also consist in hiding funds in an asset placed outside their _rms. We motivate our interest in this security-design problem referring to the `opacity' that often characterizes financial decisions of small firms, a particularly large fraction of the non-financial sector in most developed countries

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Tirelli, 2017. "Optimal Financial Contracts With Unobservable Investments," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0230, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
    • Handle: RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0230
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://host.uniroma3.it/dipartimenti/economia/pdf/
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://host.uniroma3.it/dipartimenti/economia/pdf/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Borisova, Ginka & Brown, James R., 2013. "R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds: New evidence on financing constraints and intangible investment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 159-173.
    2. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    4. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    5. Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, 1994. "Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the Behavior of Small Manufacturing Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 309-340.
    6. N. Berger, Allen & F. Udell, Gregory, 1998. "The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 613-673, August.
    7. Joaquín Poblete & Daniel Spulber, 2012. "The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(2), pages 215-234, June.
    8. Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Asymmetric Information and the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 160-165, May.
    9. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
    10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    11. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
    12. G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, 1984. "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, Spring.
    13. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(2), pages 345-363, June.
    14. Brown, James R. & Petersen, Bruce C., 2015. "Which investments do firms protect? Liquidity management and real adjustments when access to finance falls sharply," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 441-465.
    15. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1998. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 193-225, March.
    16. Fazzari, Steven M & Hubbard, R Glenn & Petersen, Bruce C, 1988. "Investment, Financing Decisions, and Tax Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 200-205, May.
    17. Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), 2010. "Handbook of the Economics of Innovation," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    18. Frank, Murray Z. & Goyal, Vidhan K., 2003. "Testing the pecking order theory of capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 217-248, February.
    19. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
    20. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    21. Hall, Bronwyn H. & Lerner, Josh, 2010. "The Financing of R&D and Innovation," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-639, Elsevier.
    22. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    23. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    24. Matthews, Steven A., 2001. "Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts under Limited Liability and Monotonicity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 1-29, March.
    25. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    26. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 2000. "Contracting with Wealth-Constrained Agents," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(3), pages 743-767, August.
    27. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
    28. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
    29. Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 21-44.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mario Tirelli, 2021. "On the optimal investment finance of small businesses," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1639-1665, April.
    2. Mario Tirelli & Luca Spinesi, 2021. "R&D financing and growth," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(1), pages 24-47, January.
    3. Langberg, Nisan, 2008. "Optimal financing for growth firms," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 379-406, July.
    4. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 32-53, February.
    5. Fohlin, Caroline, 1999. "Universal Banking in Pre-World War I Germany: Model or Myth?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 305-343, October.
    6. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger, 2003. "Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95.
    8. Paul Mizen & Cihan Yalcin, 2006. "Monetary Policy, Corporate Financial Composition and Real Activity," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 52(1), pages 177-213, March.
    9. Fabio Bertoni & María Ferrer & José Martí, 2013. "The different roles played by venture capital and private equity investors on the investment activity of their portfolio firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 607-633, April.
    10. Gabriele Angori & David Aristei, 2020. "Heterogeneity and state dependence in firms’ access to credit: Microevidence from the euro area," SEEDS Working Papers 0220, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Feb 2020.
    11. Burak Güner, A. & Malmendier, Ulrike & Tate, Geoffrey, 2008. "Financial expertise of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 323-354, May.
    12. Santiago Carbó Valverde & Rafael López del Paso, 2005. "Do non-financial firms react to monetary policy actions as banks do?," ThE Papers 05/03, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    13. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    14. Martinsson, Gustav, 2009. "Finance and R&D Investments - is there a debt overhang effect on R&D investments?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 174, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    15. Lenzu, Simone & Manaresi, Francesco, 2018. "Do Marginal Products Differ from User Costs? Micro-Level Evidence from Italian Firms," Working Papers 276, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    16. Efstathios Magerakis & Konstantinos Gkillas & Christos Floros & George Peppas, 2022. "Corporate R&D intensity and high cash holdings: post-crisis analysis," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 3767-3808, September.
    17. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1998. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 193-225, March.
    18. García-Teruel, Pedro J. & Martínez-Solano, Pedro & Sánchez-Ballesta, Juan Pedro, 2014. "The role of accruals quality in the access to bank debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 186-193.
    19. Simone Lenzu & Francesco Manaresi, 2019. "Sources and implications of resource misallocation: new evidence from firm-level marginal products and user costs," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 485, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    20. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa, 2003. "Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 315-343, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Security design; asymmetric information; moral hazard; investment decisions; debt contracts; collateral.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0230. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Telephone for information (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dero3it.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.