IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rsc/rsceui/2013-73.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Gas Network and Market: à la carte?

Author

Listed:
  • Miguel Vazquez
  • Michelle Hallack
  • Jean-Michel Glachant

Abstract

The institutional setting of open gas networks and markets is revealing considerably diverse and diverging roads taken by the US, the EU or Australia. We will show that this is explained by key choices made in the liberalization process. This liberalization is based on a redefinition of the property rights associated with transmission grid usage. That leads to different systems for the transmission services, as well as for the gas commodity trade, which in turn depends on the network services to get any market deal actually implemented. Not only do those choices depend on the physical architecture of the network, but also the perceived difficulties and costs to coordinate the actual transmission services through certain market arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallack & Jean-Michel Glachant, 2013. "Gas Network and Market: à la carte?," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/73, European University Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2013/73
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28178/RSCAS_2013_73.pdf?sequence=1
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/28178
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yoram Barzel, 1997. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Chapters, in: Svetozar Pejovich (ed.), The Economic Foundations of Property Rights, chapter 13, pages 171-192, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Larry E. Ruff, 2012. "Rethinking Gas Markets--and Capacity," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    3. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
    4. Hubbard, R Glenn & Weiner, Robert J, 1992. "Long-Term Contracting and Multiple-Price Systems," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 177-198, April.
    5. Shy,Oz, 2001. "The Economics of Network Industries," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521805001, September.
    6. Libecap, Gary D., 1986. "Property rights in economic history: Implications for research," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 227-252, July.
    7. Masten, Scott E & Crocker, Keith J, 1985. "Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1083-1093, December.
    8. Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallack & Jean-Michel Glachant, 2012. "Designing the European Gas Market: More Liquid & Less Natural?," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    9. Makholm, Jeff D., 2012. "The Political Economy of Pipelines," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226502106, December.
    10. Alfred E. Kahn, 1988. "The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262610523, April.
    11. Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
    12. Makholm, Jeff D., 2012. "The Political Economy of Pipelines," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226502120, December.
    13. Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
    14. Aad Correljé & Martijn Groenleer & Jasper Veldman, 2013. "Understanding institutional change: the development of institutions for the regulation of natural gas transportation systems in the US and the EU," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/07, European University Institute.
    15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5372 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Michelle Hallack & Miguel Vazquez, 2012. "The impact of who decides the rules for network use: A 'common pool' analysis of the investment dynamics in different gas network regulatory frames," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/52, European University Institute.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shastitko, A. & Kurdin, A. & Filippova, I., 2020. "Structural alternatives of the gas transportation organization through an insulated pipeline," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 128-156.
    2. Jing Xu & Michelle Hallack & Miguel Vazquez, 2017. "Applying a third party access model for China’s gas pipeline network: an independent pipeline operator and congestion rent transfer," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 72-97, February.
    3. Jean-Michel Glachant, 2014. "Governance in Network Industries: Lessons Learnt from New Institutional Economics," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/67, European University Institute.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jean-Michel Glachant & Michelle Hallack & Miguel Vazquez, 2014. "Gas network and market diversity in the US, the EU and Australia: A story of network access rights," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/33, European University Institute.
    2. Glachant, Jean-Michel & Hallack, Michelle & Vazquez, Miguel, 2014. "Gas network and market “à la Carte”: Identifying the fundamental choices," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 238-245.
    3. Vazquez, Miguel & Hallack, Michelle, 2015. "Interaction between gas and power market designs," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 23-33.
    4. Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallack, 2013. "Interaction between gas and electricity market-based trading in the short run," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/42, European University Institute.
    5. Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallack, 2016. "Short-Term Allocation Of Gas Networks And Gas-Electricity Input Foreclosure," Anais do XLII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 42nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 126, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    6. Vazquez, Miguel & Hallack, Michelle, 2013. "Need and design of short-term auctions in the EU gas markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 484-493.
    7. Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallack, 2013. "Short-term allocation of gas networks in the EU and gas-electricity input foreclosure," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/41, European University Institute.
    8. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
    9. Brian S. Klaas, 2003. "Professional Employer Organizations and Their Role in Small and Medium Enterprises: The Impact of HR Outsourcing," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 28(1), pages 43-62, January.
    10. ABADA, Ibrahim & EHRENMANN, Andreas & SMEERS, Yves, 2014. "Endogenizing long-term contracts in gas market models," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. repec:bla:jomstd:v:47:y:2010:i:s1:p:859-883 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Keller, Jann T. & Kuper, Gerard H. & Mulder, Machiel, 2019. "Mergers of Germany's natural gas market areas: Is transmission capacity booked efficiently?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 104-119.
    13. Chi Kong Chyong and David M. Reiner, 2015. "Economics and Politics of Shale Gas in Europe," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    14. Timothy Tardiff, 2015. "Prices based on current cost or historical cost: How different are they?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 201-217, April.
    15. Chi Kong Chyong, 2019. "European Natural Gas Markets: Taking Stock and Looking Forward," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(1), pages 89-109, August.
    16. Anne Neumann & Sophia Rüster & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2015. "Long-Term Contracts in the Natural Gas Industry: Literature Survey and Data on 426 Contracts (1965-2014)," Data Documentation 77, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    17. LaPlue, Lawrence D., 2022. "Environmental consequences of natural gas wellhead pricing deregulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    18. Robert A. Ritz, 2019. "A Strategic Perspective on Competition between Pipeline Gas and LNG," The Energy Journal, , vol. 40(5), pages 195-220, September.
    19. Gary D. Libecap, 1990. "Comments on Elinor Ostrom," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(1), pages 112-116, January.
    20. Corey Johnson & Tim Boersma, 2015. "The politics of energy security: contrasts between the United States and the European Union," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 171-177, March.
    21. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    network regulation; gas market; property rights; carriage systems;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2013/73. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: RSCAS web unit (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rsiueit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.