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A Comprehensive Study of Regional Labor Markets: The Structural Imbalances and the Behavior of Participants. Monitoring of Wages, the Experience of Reforming the System of Remuneration of Public Sector Employees
[Комплексное Исследование Региональных Рынков Труда: Структурные Дисбалансы И Поведение Участников. Мониторинг Заработной Платы, Опыт Реформирования Системы Оплаты Труда Работников Бюджетной Сферы]

Author

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  • Maleva, Tatiana Mikhailovna (Малева, Татьяна Михайловна)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

  • Kirillova, M. K. (Кириллова, М. К.)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

  • Mkrtchyan, Nikita (Мкртчян, Никита)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

  • Florinskaya, Yulia (Флоринская, Юлия)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

  • Lyashok, Victor (Ляшок, Виктор)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

Abstract

Decrease in number and aging of the working population of Russia is changing the scope and structure of labor supply. The functioning of the economy in this new environment increases the uncertainty, the study updates the structural characteristics of supply and demand, allowing participants to assess the behavior of the labor market. As part of this work is considered an internal reallocation of labor (internal migration), the characteristics of external labor migration, study personnel capacities and improve the performance of the economy as an example of regional labor markets. The empirical basis for the analysis of regional labor markets is a comprehensive study that brings together representatives of management survey of enterprises and population in the age of economic activity between the two regions of the Russian Federation, the most complete reprezentirujushchih studied processes. The data allow to analyze the organizational and technical changes in recent years at the enterprises of the real sector, and their performance, installation, and management's assessment of companies, issues of staffing. Integration with survey data population of the regions makes it possible to analyze the current and potential imbalances in the labor market.

Suggested Citation

  • Maleva, Tatiana Mikhailovna (Малева, Татьяна Михайловна) & Kirillova, M. K. (Кириллова, М. К.) & Mkrtchyan, Nikita (Мкртчян, Никита) & Florinskaya, Yulia (Флоринская, Юлия) & Lyashok, Victor (Ляшок, В, 2015. "A Comprehensive Study of Regional Labor Markets: The Structural Imbalances and the Behavior of Participants. Monitoring of Wages, the Experience of Reforming the System of Remuneration of Public Secto," Working Papers mak15n7, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, revised 01 Oct 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:mak15n7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kwok, Peter & Leland, Hayne, 1984. "Migration and Asymmetric Information: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 535-535, June.
    2. Morelli, Massimo & Montero, Maria, 2003. "The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 137-155, January.
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    Keywords

    labor market; regions; Russia;
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