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Markets in the Field of the State Defense Order: Opportunities and Limitations for the Development of Competition
[Рынки В Сфере Государственного Оборонного Заказа: Возможности И Ограничения Для Развития Конкуренции]

Author

Listed:
  • Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Morozov, Anton (Морозов, Антон)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

In the context of the development of measures to improve the efficiency of the state defense order, the question arises as to how much the development of competition can help in this: in the whole sphere of the state defense order there are prerequisites for developing competition, is it possible to define the boundaries beyond which the development of competition becomes inexpedient and whether the prospect of development of competition in the long-term period of costs and possible net losses in the short-term period is worth? In order to obtain answers to these questions, theoretical and empirical studies on the effects of competition in the defense sphere are systematized. Criteria have been singled out on the basis of which it is possible to typify defense products markets from the point of view of opportunities and prospects for the development of competition: buyer dependence, information openness, degree of production regulation, availability of analogues and potential product substitutes, technological cycle features, regularity of supplies and product lifetime. A methodology for assessing the prospects for competition in markets in the sphere of state defense order is proposed in accordance with the specified criteria.

Suggested Citation

  • Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья) & Morozov, Anton (Морозов, Антон), 2018. "Markets in the Field of the State Defense Order: Opportunities and Limitations for the Development of Competition [Рынки В Сфере Государственного Оборонного Заказа: Возможности И Ограничения Для Ра," Working Papers 061811, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:061811
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bower, Anthony G, 1993. "Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 873-901, November.
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    3. De Fraja, Gianni & Hartley, Keith, 1996. "Defence Procurement: Theory and UK Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 12(4), pages 70-88, Winter.
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    Keywords

    competitive policy; state defense order; military-industrial complex;
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