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Analysis of the Essence of Control and Supervisory Activities in Russia and Abroad
[Анализ Сущности Контрольно-Надзорной Деятельности В России И За Рубежом]

Author

Listed:
  • Barinova, Vera (Баринова, Вера)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Eremkin, V.A. (Еремкин, В.А.)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Lanshina, T.A. (Ланьшина, Т.А.)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

This paper examines the nature of governmental control and supervisory activities and regulation, including the differences between the domestic and foreign approaches to these definitions. The authors show the contradictions in the approaches to the definition of control and supervision in Russia, identify their main characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • Barinova, Vera (Баринова, Вера) & Eremkin, V.A. (Еремкин, В.А.) & Lanshina, T.A. (Ланьшина, Т.А.), 2017. "Analysis of the Essence of Control and Supervisory Activities in Russia and Abroad [Анализ Сущности Контрольно-Надзорной Деятельности В России И За Рубежом]," Working Papers 051722, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:051722
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 409-435, February.
    2. Alcidi, Cinzia & Thirion, Gilles, 2016. "Assessing the Euro Area’s Shock-Absorption Capacity - Risk sharing, consumption smoothing and fiscal policyAbstract: Based on a combination of quantitative analysis and a qualitative forward-looking a," CEPS Papers 11875, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    3. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
    4. Erika Tóth, 2007. "National cultures and European identity. The process of Engrenage among European Commission civil servants," Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 29(3), pages 413-431, December.
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