U.S. Research Joint Ventures with International Partners

In the United States, as in most industrialized nations, aggregate technological advancement declined during the 1970s and early 1980s. The U.S. Congress was quick to respond to this down turn by passing a number of technology- and innovation-related initiatives, one of which was the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984. It has been argued that this policy response is an example of government acting as entrepreneur because the enabling legislation was both innovative and characterized by entrepreneurial risk. In this paper we examine empirically covariates with the trend in the formation of research joint ventures (RJVs) promulgated by the NCRA and with the probability that a RJV will have an international research partner. We find that RJV formations seem to increase in times when industrial investments in research and development (R&D) decrease, and we conclude that RJVs might thus be a substitute for internal R&D activity. We also find that the probability of a RJV having an international research partner increases as the membership size of the RJV increases. We conclude that as membership size increases, the ability of any one member to appropriate the collective research contributions from the other members, and thus gain a competitive advantage, decreases. Thus, the cost of including in the RJV an international partner, which we argue could represent a potential intellectual capital leakage, decreases.