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Distribución Directa a las Personas de la Renta Hidrocarburífera: Impactos Macroeconómicos

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  • Morales, Juan Antonio

    (IISEC, Universidad Católica Boliviana)

Abstract

Bolivia se ha estado beneficiando significativamente en los últimos cuatro años de la bonanza de los mercados internacionales para sus exportaciones de bienes primarios, principalmente de hidrocarburos. La pregunta fundamental es entonces cómo maximizar inter-temporalmente (e internalizar) los beneficios de esa buena fortuna. Es central la idea en este trabajo que distribuyendo directamente las rentas hidrocarburíferas que percibe el estado a la población elegible, se tendría un aumento sostenible del consumo de las familias, porque se minimizaría el rentismo y, también, porque al mejorar la distribución del ingreso aumentaría el crecimiento de largo plazo del PIB. Se arguye que la distribución directa no tendría efecto disuasivo alguno ni sobre la intensidad del trabajo ni sobre las inversiones del sector privado. Sin embargo, se admite que podría reducirse la inversión pública. Se identifican los efectos en el crecimiento y la estabilidad macroeconómica de la decisión entre distribuir directamente la renta hidrocarburífera o usarla en inversiones públicas. Instituto de Investigaciones Socio - Económicas; IISEC

Suggested Citation

  • Morales, Juan Antonio, 2008. "Distribución Directa a las Personas de la Renta Hidrocarburífera: Impactos Macroeconómicos," Documentos de trabajo 7/2008, Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Económicas (IISEC), Universidad Católica Boliviana.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:iisecd:2008_007
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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