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The Implications of Information Lags for the Stabilization Bias and Optimal Delegation

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Paul Lam

    (University of Waterloo, Canada and The Rimini Centre for Economics Analysis, Italy)

  • Florian Pelgrin

    (University of Lausanne, Switzerland)

Abstract

Many papers for example Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) have shown that in a New Keynesian model with a significant degree of forward-looking behaviour, policy regimes that target either the change in the output-gap (speed limit targeting) or nominal income growth can considerably reduce the size of the stabilization bias - the inefficiency that arises when a central bank conducts policy under discretion as opposed to commitment. Inflation targeting can also reduce the size of the stabilization bias but unless inflation expectations in the model are predominantly backward-looking, this targeting regime does not perform as well as speed limit or nominal income growth targeting. Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) obtain their results using a New Keynesian model where changes in the policy rate affect macroeconomic variables immediately. In this paper, we compare the performance of several targeting regimes by using a New Keynesian model that includes a delayed response of monetary policy as a result of information lags. We find two results that are substantially different from Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003). First the size of the stabilization bias is considerably reduced. Second, a regime that targets inflation outperforms a regime that targets either the change in the output-gap or the growth in nominal income even when inflation expectations are very forward-looking.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Lam & Florian Pelgrin, 2007. "The Implications of Information Lags for the Stabilization Bias and Optimal Delegation," Working Paper series 39_07, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    • Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:39_07
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1998. "An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy: Expanded Version," NBER Technical Working Papers 0233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Carl Walsh, 2003. "Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 265-278, March.
    4. Glenn D. Rudebusch, 2002. "Assessing Nominal Income Rules for Monetary Policy with Model and Data Uncertainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 402-432, April.
    5. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 928-956, September.
    6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stabilization bias; Inflation Targeting; Discretion; Commitment; Information Lag;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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