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Taxation, Redistribution and Frictional Labor Supply

Author

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  • Hakki Yazici

    (Sabanci University)

  • Christopher Sleet

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

Abstract

We analyze the implications of ex ante dispersion in worker talents and a frictional labor market for the design of tax and benefit systems. Our model features on and off the job search, job ladders and equilibrium income and profit dispersion within talent markets. In a baseline setting with no talent dispersion, the optimal system consists of an unemployment benefit financed out of a simple lump sum tax on workers. The benefit is high enough to suppress worker income and firm profit dispersion, deter worker poaching and collapse job ladders. With talent dispersion, high benefit levels drive less talented workers out of the market and are prohibitively costly. Active talent markets are frictional. Taxes impact the dispersion of worker incomes and firm profits within these markets. These effects shape and modify conventional optimal tax formulas.

Suggested Citation

  • Hakki Yazici & Christopher Sleet, 2017. "Taxation, Redistribution and Frictional Labor Supply," 2017 Meeting Papers 298, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed017:298
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferey, Antoine, 2022. "Redistribution and Unemployment Insurance," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 345, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    2. Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 371-402.
    3. Bagger, Jesper & Moen, Espen R. & Vejlin, Rune Majlund, 2021. "Equilibrium Worker-Firm Allocations and the Deadweight Losses of Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 14865, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Albert Jan Hummel, 2021. "Unemployment and Tax Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 9177, CESifo.
    5. Thibaut Lamadon & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2022. "Imperfect Competition, Compensating Differentials, and Rent Sharing in the US Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(1), pages 169-212, January.
    6. Jean‐Baptiste Michau, 2021. "On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 382-414, January.
    7. Albert Jan Hummel, 2021. "Unemployment and tax design," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-061/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Albert Jan Hummel, 2021. "Monopsony Power, Income Taxation and Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 9128, CESifo.
    9. Dami'an Vergara, 2022. "Minimum Wages and Optimal Redistribution," Papers 2202.00839, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2022.
    10. Albert Jan Hummel, 2021. "Monopsony power, income taxation and welfare," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-051/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. Jake Bradley & Axel Gottfries, 2021. "A job ladder model with stochastic employment opportunities," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(4), pages 1399-1430, November.
    12. Jesper Bagger & Espen Moen & Rune Vejlin, 2018. "Optimal Taxation with On-the-Job Search," 2018 Meeting Papers 805, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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