IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed015/1011.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Advertised Prices in Decentralized Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Derek Stacey

    (Ryerson University)

Abstract

A model of a decentralized market is developed that features search frictions, advertised prices and bargaining. Sellers can post ask prices to attract buyers through a process of directed search, but ex post there is the possibility of renegotiation. Similarly, buyers can advertise negotiable bid prices to attract sellers. Even though transaction prices often differ from quoted prices, advertised bid and ask prices play a crucial role in directing search and reducing trading frictions. The features and predictions of the model align well with aspects of the secondary market for transferable taxicab license plates in Toronto. This provides a useful and unique context for studying the relationships between advertised and actual prices in a decentralized market.

Suggested Citation

  • Derek Stacey, 2015. "Advertised Prices in Decentralized Markets," 2015 Meeting Papers 1011, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed015:1011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2015/paper_1011.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2017. "Competing with asking prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    2. Michael A. Arnold, 1999. "Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 453-481, September.
    3. Chen, Yongmin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1996. "Asking Prices as Commitment Devices," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(1), pages 129-155, February.
    4. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-1454, September.
    5. Gabriele Camera & Cemil Selcuk, 2009. "Price Dispersion with Directed Search," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1193-1224, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Derek Stacey, 2019. "Posted Prices, Search and Bargaining," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 85-104, July.
    2. Han, Lu & Strange, William C., 2015. "The Microstructure of Housing Markets," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 813-886, Elsevier.
    3. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2017. "Competing with asking prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    4. Kennes, John & le Maire, Daniel & Roelsgaard, Sebastian T., 2020. "Equivalence of canonical matching models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 169-182.
    5. James Albrecht & Pieter Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2016. "Directed Search in the Housing Market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 19, pages 218-231, January.
    6. Selcuk, Cemil, 2013. "Motivated sellers and predation in the housing market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 203-214.
    7. Selcuk, Cemil, 2012. "Motivated Sellers & Predatory Buyers," MPRA Paper 36226, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Simon Stevenson & James Young, 2015. "The Role of Undisclosed Reserves in English Open Outcry Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 375-402, June.
    9. Merlo, Antonio & Ortalo-Magne, Francois, 2004. "Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 192-216, September.
    10. Antonio Merlo & François Ortalo-Magné, 2002. "Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England (Third Version)," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 11 Mar 2004.
    11. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher, 2012. "On The Game‐Theoretic Foundations Of Competitive Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-21, February.
    12. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2014. "Competing with Asking Prices," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-37, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    13. Antonia Díaz & Belén Jerez, 2013. "House Prices, Sales, And Time On The Market: A Search‐Theoretic Framework," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 837-872, August.
    14. Peyman Khezr & Flavio Menezes, 2018. "Auctions with an asking price," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1329-1350, November.
    15. Watanabe Makoto, 2020. "Middlemen: A Directed Search Equilibrium Approach," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-37, June.
    16. Matthew Doyle & Jacob Wong, 2013. "Wage Posting Without Full Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(2), pages 231-252, April.
    17. Selcuk, Cemil, 2010. "Motivated Sellers in the Housing Market," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2010/2, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    18. Gomis-Porqueras Pedro & Julien Benoît & Wang Liang, 2018. "Competitive Search with Ex-post Opportunism," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-17, January.
    19. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2015. "Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-51, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    20. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed015:1011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Zimmermann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.