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Sovereign Bailouts

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Martinez

    (International Monetary Fund)

  • Juan Hatchondo

    (Indiana University)

  • Burhanettin Kuruscu

    (University of Toronto)

  • Bulent Guler

    (Indiana University - Bloomington)

Abstract

We extend the standard Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) sovereign default model to study bailout policies. In our setup a country that concentrates a significant fraction of bond holders decide on a period by period basis whether to bailout a debtor government. The combination of bailout policies and decentralized lending decisions give rise to a pecuniary externality.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Martinez & Juan Hatchondo & Burhanettin Kuruscu & Bulent Guler, 2014. "Sovereign Bailouts," 2014 Meeting Papers 1278, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed014:1278
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Enrique G. Mendoza & Vivian Z. Yue, 2012. "A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(2), pages 889-946.
    4. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
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    6. Cuadra, Gabriel & Sapriza, Horacio, 2008. "Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 78-88, September.
    7. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
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