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Efficiency With Endogenous Information Choice

Author

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  • Venky Venkateswaran
  • Luis Llosa

    (UCLA)

Abstract

We study the efficiency of information acquisition decisions in models with dispersed information and strategic considerations. Our main result is that information choice is typically inefficient because agents do not fully internalize the effects of their information on others. This ex-ante suboptimality is obtained even in environments where information is used efficiently ex-post. We demonstrate this finding in 3 benchmark environments. In a beauty contest model `a la Morris and Shin (1998), incentives to invest in information can diverge from the socially optimal level because the absolute level of the plannerâÂÂs welfare criterion is different from that of the private payoff function. In a RBC framework with dispersed information about technology shocks, distortions due to imperfect substitutability have no effect on incentives to respond to information, but distort the private value of information, leading to an inefficiently low level of information acquired in equilibrium. Finally, in a monetary model with nominal price-setting by heterogeneously informed firms, inefficiencies arise in both the use and the acquisition of information. Importantly, the latter persist even when the former are removed. We also discuss optimal policy response to address these inefficiencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Venky Venkateswaran & Luis Llosa, 2012. "Efficiency With Endogenous Information Choice," 2012 Meeting Papers 660, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed012:660
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    1. Florin O. Bilbiie & Fabio Ghironi & Marc J. Melitz, 2019. "Monopoly Power and Endogenous Product Variety: Distortions and Remedies," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 140-174, October.
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    5. Venky Venkateswaran, 2011. "Heterogeneous Information and Labor Market Fluctuations," 2011 Meeting Papers 1292, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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    11. Colombo, Luca & Femminis, Gianluca, 2008. "The social value of public information with costly information acquisition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 196-199, August.
    12. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2008. "On the Sources and Value of Information: Public Announcements and Macroeconomic Performance," Economics Series Working Papers 411, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    13. Jayant Vivek Ganguli & Liyan Yang, 2009. "Complementarities, Multiplicity, and Supply Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 90-115, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Caplin & Mark Dean & John Leahy, 2022. "Rationally Inattentive Behavior: Characterizing and Generalizing Shannon Entropy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(6), pages 1676-1715.
    2. Kurlat, Pablo & Veldkamp, Laura, 2015. "Should we regulate financial information?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 697-720.
    3. Catilina, Eliane, 2019. "Information Acquisition with Endogenously Determined Cost in Cournot Markets with Stochastic Demand," MPRA Paper 93896, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2019. "Information acquisition and use by networked players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 360-401.
    5. Biais, Bruno & Foucault, Thierry & Moinas, Sophie, 2015. "Equilibrium fast trading," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 292-313.
    6. Ryan Chahrour, 2014. "Public Communication and Information Acquisition," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 73-101, July.
    7. Baeriswyl, Romain & Boun My, Kene & Cornand, Camille, 2021. "Double overreaction in beauty contests with information acquisition: Theory and experiment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 432-445.
    8. Gaetano Gaballo, 2016. "Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 42-97, January.
    9. Luigi Iovino & Jennifer La'O & George-Marios Angeletos, 2016. "Efficiency and Policy with Endogenous Learning," 2016 Meeting Papers 229, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2014. "Central bank communication design in a Lucas-Phelps economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 64-79.
    11. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    12. Xavier Vives, 2017. "Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 935-963.
    13. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. George-Marios Angeletos & Karthik Sastry, 2019. "Inattentive Economies," NBER Working Papers 26413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Mackowiak, Bartosz & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2011. "Inattention to Rare Events," CEPR Discussion Papers 8626, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier, 2015. "Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 407-426.
    17. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2015. "Cournot competition and the social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 466-506.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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