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Sistema financiero, informalidad y evasión tributaria en el Perú

Author

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  • Lahura, Erick

    (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú)

Abstract

Según el Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, una unidad productiva se denomina informal si no está registrada en la administración tributaria. Este trabajo de investigación identifica a los informales que han adquirido al menos un crédito en el sistema financiero, describe su participación por entidad financiera y tipo de crédito, y estima el monto de evasión tributaria correspondiente. Para ello, se utilizó información de la administración tributaria y de los créditos otorgados por el sistema financiero. Los resultados muestran que a diciembre de 2014 había aproximadamente 1,8 millones de informales (aproximadamente 19 por ciento del total de deudores del sistema financiero) que tenían al menos un crédito en alguna entidad del sistema financiero, lo cual indica que existiría un margen importante para la ampliación de la base tributaria. También se encuentra que las Cajas Rurales, Edpymes y Financieras son las entidades con mayores tasas de informalidad, tanto en términos de número de clientes como de saldos de créditos. Además, los créditos obtenidos por los informales fueron otorgados principalmente por Financieras, Cajas Municipales y Bancos, mientras que los montos más importantes correspondieron a créditos para micro y pequeña empresa (Mypes), créditos de consumo y tarjetas de crédito. En términos de estabilidad financiera, estos resultados sugieren que sería prudencial vigilar y cuantificar la exposición al riesgo por informalidad en el sistema financiero. Finalmente, se estima que la evasión tributaria de los clientes informales del sistema financiero habría sido aproximadamente 0,7 por ciento del PBI en el año 2014.

Suggested Citation

  • Lahura, Erick, 2016. "Sistema financiero, informalidad y evasión tributaria en el Perú," Working Papers 2016-011, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
    • Handle: RePEc:rbp:wpaper:2016-011
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
    2. Arias, Luis Alberto, 2009. "La tributación directa en América Latina: equidad y desafíos. El caso de Perú," Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 5454, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    3. Nikolaos Artavanis & Adair Morse & Margarita Tsoutsoura, 2016. "Measuring Income Tax Evasion Using Bank Credit: Evidence from Greece," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(2), pages 739-798.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco B. Galarza & Fernando Requejo, 2019. "Reducing Informality Using Two-Sided Incentives: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 149, Peruvian Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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