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A Model of Two-stage Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters

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Abstract

This paper proposes a two-party spatial model of policy and valence issues for office-seeking candidates who face a two-stage electoral process with strategic voters. We study how the difference in valences among candidates affects the equilibrium outcomes when voters are strategic and candidates consider their winning chances in general and primary elections. Our results indicate that compared with the case of just maximizing her party median voters expected payoff, a forward-looking challenger chooses a more moderate policy so that she can appeal to the general population, and that the winning probability in the general election for the winning candidate in the primary election increases because of the more moderate policy promise that she chooses. The model is analytically tractable, and provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about holding primary elections. Finally, we provide empirical predictions on primaries and the roles of valences in elections.

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  • Shino Takayama, 2014. "A Model of Two-stage Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters," Discussion Papers Series 525, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    • Handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:525
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    File URL: https://economics.uq.edu.au/files/46010/525.pdf
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    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
    2. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    3. Gilles Serra, 2011. "Why primaries? The party’s tradeoff between policy and valence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 21-51, January.
    4. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
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    6. Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, 2006. "Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 547-569, June.
    7. James Coleman, 1971. "Internal processes governing party positions in elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 35-60, September.
    8. Chen, Kong-Pin & Yang, Sheng-Zhang, 2002. "Strategic Voting in Open Primaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 1-30, July.
    9. John E. Roemer, 1997. "Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 479-502.
    10. Gerber, Elisabeth R & Morton, Rebecca B, 1998. "Primary Election Systems and Representation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 304-324, October.
    11. Adams, James & Ezrow, Lawrence & Merrill, Samuel & Somer-Topcu, Zeynep, 2013. "Does Collective Responsibility for Performance Alter Party Strategies? Policy-Seeking Parties in Proportional Systems," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-23, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Andreottola, 2020. "Signaling Valence in Primary Elections," CSEF Working Papers 559, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    2. Diego Carrasco Novoa & Shino Takayamaz & Yuki Tamura & Terence Yeo, 2020. "Primaries, Strategic Voters and Heterogeneous Valences," Discussion Papers Series 631, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    3. Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2015. "A Nash Equilibrium in Electoral Competition Models," Discussion Papers Series 546, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    4. Bernard Grofman & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers 135286117, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    5. Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura & Terence Yeo, 2019. "Primaries, Strategic Voters and Heterogenous Valences," Discussion Papers Series 605, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    6. Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura & Terence Yeo, 2016. "Nash Equilibrium and Party Polarization in an Electoral Competition Model," Discussion Papers Series 575, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    7. Andreottola, Giovanni, 2021. "Signaling valence in primary elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 1-32.

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